Plain Talk about Systems Complicatedness by Kelemen, Jozef
Plain Talk about Systems Complicatedness
Jozef Kelemen
Institute of Computer Science, Silesian University
Opava, Czech Republic
and VSM College of Management, Bratislava, Slovakia
kel10um@axpsu.fpf.slu.cz
1 Introduction
This extremely informal contribution sketches an extremely informal proposal of
classification of systems according their (up to now only intuitively) comprehended
complicatedness by providing few examples from the fields of (theoretical) com-
puter science, (computer) arts, and economics. The intuitive comprehension pro-
vides, however, at least in certain extent, an extension of theoretically well-founded
and deeply studied classification of computing systems and their behavior (compu-
tation, algorithms) according different complexity measures into complexity classes
of systems and behaviors with the same complexity as known in the traditional the-
oretical computer science. Almost all of our professional considerations are up to
now traditional in the sense that almost all of us try to cover all of the appealing
objects (languages, molecules, membrane structures), and phenomena (sentence
generations, DNA mutations, cells functioning) into the traditional, of course in
many situations very well-working, paradigm of the Turing computability, and of
the spectrum of formal models performing these type of computation.
Our aim is to extend the typology of systems by some intuitive classes of
systems with more or less similar level of complicatedness in order to include to
the potential formalistic debate also systems inspired by some advances in artificial
intelligence, artificial life, cognitive science and similar disciplines despite of this
notion has - at least up to now - not a very clear status in the hardcore theories
of computation.
First of all, it seems to by reasonable to specify at least intuitively what we will
in this plain talk understood as a system. We will concentrate to systems which
produce some symbolic behaviors or structures on the base of transforming another
(sensed) symbols or symbol structures into the form of their output structures
or their behavioral units. More or less autonomous agents as described e.g. in
(Kelemen, 2006) are examples of such systems. The next sections will provide a
couple of examples.
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We note that from our point of view also collections of systems working together
in order to generate a behavior (e.g. multi-agent systems, decentralized systems,
societies of systems) may be considered as unique systems.
Our second duty is the - at least intuitive - a specification of the meaning of
complicatedness. By complicatedness we will mean a structural property of a sys-
tem which provides a base for producing the behavior of this system. If a behavior
is given, then ”What is the less complicated system which is able to perform this
behavior?” seems to be one among the most appealing question related to systems
complicatedness.
2 Simple Systems
Simple systems are, according our intuition, systems having a specific property
- if we have several such systems, then behavior of the society composed from
such systems will be in certain meaning only the simple result of their individual
behavior.
More formally and more generally speaking from the point of view of their
behavior are simple systems closed under set-algebraic operation like union, in-
tersection, Kleene’s * operation, and set complementation operation. From such a
perspective, some of the formal grammars - understood as generators of behaviors
in the form of sets of strings of symbols (languages) are simple systems: Having
two context-free grammars, the behavior which results from the union of their
individual behaviors (context-free languages generate by them) is again a behav-
ior (a context-free language) which can be generated by another corresponding
context-free grammar. Similar is the situation with other models, too: If we have,
for instance, two finite automata, and we form the set-theoretic union (or we use
some other suitable operation) of their behaviors (the union of two regular lan-
guages accepted by them, or some other operation over these two languages) we
receive a regular language again, and we are able to construct a finite automaton
which will accept the resulting regular language.
From the position of the theoretical computer science we may state, that simple
systems are all theoretical models related to computation (automata, machines,
grammars) the class of languages corresponding to which are closed under the
traditional (above mentioned) set-theoretic (and also to the other traditional ones
- concatenation, and reversal) operations usually studied in theoretical computer
science. More details on these models and their closures under set-theoretic (and
some other) operations are included into each course-book on theoretical computer
science; let us mention e.g. (Hopcroft, Ullman, 1969, Chapter 9). The infinitely
large classes of regular, context-free, context-sensitive, and recursively enumerable
languages (sets) have this property with respect the operation of union, concate-
nation, intersection, and reversal; see (Hopcroft, Ullman, 1969, Theorem 9.1).
There are several possibilities of how to define different complexity measures
which reflects in a very formal, theoretic level some of the characteristics of simple
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systems, and how to use the differences induced by these measures in order to
stratify simple systems according these measures into different complexity classes,
to relate these classes, to study the possibility of partial reduction of one to another,
etc.; more details provides e.g. (Hromkovic, 1997).
Another possibilities of how to define different classes of languages using some
biologically well-inspired models of computing devices can be found e.g. in (Paun,
Rozenberg, Salomaa, 1998) for computational interpretations of some of impor-
tant biochemical processes appearing between nucleic acid macromolecules, and in
(Paun, 2002) for the case of computing motivated by biochemical and biophysical
processes appearing in (organic) membrane systems like cells, for instance.
3 Systems with Emerging Behavior
The traditional and most widely used informal definition of emergence is formu-
lated in (Holland, 1998, pp. 121-122): Emergence is ”... a product of coupled,
context-dependent interactions. Technically these interactions, and the resulting
system, are nonlinear: The behavior of the overall system cannot be obtained
by summing the behaviors of its constituent parts... However, we can reduce the
behavior of the whole to the lawful behavior of its parts, if we take nonlinear
interactions into account”.
In connection with the phenomenon of emergence, another phenomenon ap-
peared very interesting form the computational point of view - the notion of emer-
gent computation. The premise of emergent computation is - according (Forrest,
1991, p. 1) - that interesting and useful computational systems can be constructed
by exploiting interactions among primitive components, and further, that for some
kinds of problems (e.g. modeling intelligent behavior) it may be the only feasible
method. The formal study of such processes and the systems behind them is in the
focus of the professional attention up to now, and might be interesting to reflect it
not only in experiments in the field of artificial intelligence and artificial life, but
also in the context of theories of formal symbolic behavior generators.
Systems with emerging behavior are in fact multi-agent systems because they
are set up from a number of individually behaving component systems. Com-
ponent systems have their own behaviors, and they have also some possibilities
to communicate in some indirect ways, sharing the common ”environment”, for
instance, say, e.g., rewriting symbols in a shared string. Good candidates for be-
come to be systems with emerging behavior are grammar systems as presented in
(Csuhaj-Varju et al., 1994), or eco-grammar systems (Csuhaj-Varju et al., 1997).
Consider now component systems to be simple systems from some complex-
ity classes, and consider the behavior of the whole system composed from the
component systems now. We may recognize two possibilities:
1. the systems will produce behavior from one of the complexity classes of the
component systems, or
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2. the system will produce a behavior from another complexity class. In the sec-
ond case the behavior of the system is emergent, it emerges from the behaviors
of the component systems, and the systems will be called system with emerging
behavior.
The emergent behavior of such systems satisfies the emergence test formulated
in (Roland et al., 1999) consisting in the following three basic testing steps:
a) Design. The designer designs the systems by describing local interactions be-
tween components in a language L1.
b) Observation. The observer describes global behaviors of the running system
using a language L2.
c) Surprise. The language of design L1 and the language of observation L2 are
distinct, and the causal link between the elementary interactions programmed
in L1 and the observations observed in L2 are non-obvious.
A suitable example of systems with emerging behavior are variants of grammar
systems, c.f. (Csuhaj-Varju et al., 1994), called colonies (Kelemen, Kelemenova,
1992). In the case of colonies finite sets of regular grammars cooperating as mem-
bers of a grammar system are able to generate the members of all of the family of
context-free languages; the relation of this phenomenon to the emergence is dis-
cussed in (Kelemen, 2004). Some remarks on a possibility how to attack the formal
treatment of the problem of emergence from the positions of the traditional for-
mal language theory and the theory including the theory of abstract families of
languages into considerations, is presented in (Freund, Kelemen, Paun, 2003).
4 Hyper-Computing Systems
Hyper-computing systems are, very roughly speaking, systems, which go by their
computing potentials in certain senses beyond the limits of traditional Turing-
computation. Burgin and Klinger (2004) described the relevant opinions, and in
the special issue of TCS Journal in which the just mentioned article is published
and which is edited by them, collects a couple of other interesting opinions.
In (Stannett, 2004) the problem of hyper-computation is connected in an ele-
gant way by the Turing machine and the Church-Turing thesis by making explicit
the following three points:
1. Computation in a Turing machine is in fact a controlled manipulation of con-
figurations, where each configuration encodes a finite amount of information
as a state, a finite amount of information as memory, and a finite amount of
information as program.
2. Turing machines control structure is constrained both by the current config-
uration of it, and by the requirement that only one program instruction is
executed at a time.
Plain Talk about Systems Complicatedness 149
Then the Church-Turing thesis expresses the conviction that any ”cosmetic
changes” in the architecture of the Turing machine have no principal influence to
its the computational power (may be they have some influence the traditionally
understood complexity requirements of performed computation, but what is not
computable by a Turing machines remains not computable by other machines,
too).
Stannett in the above mentioned article concludes with the statement, that
there are only four obvious ways of modifications of the Turing machine: the tem-
poral structure of computation, the information contents of memory, the informa-
tion content of programs, and the information content of states. Then he provides
the list of publications which attacked the problem from the mentioned obvious
ways.
Let us to provide an example of such systems producing non recursive behavior
which is not mentioned in (Stannett, 2004). In connection with another variant
of grammar systems - with so called eco-grammar systems (Csuhaj-Varju et al.,
1997) - some observations concerning the hyper-computing potentials of this model
is provided in (Watjen, 2003). Roughly and informally speaking, Watjen in his just
mentioned article proved that if into an eco-grammar system which uses teams of
components for generating strings of symbols, a non-recursive function is included
which defines the number of components in teams for each step of the derivation
process, then such an eco-grammar system is able to generate non-recursive lan-
guages. Let us mention marginally, that the pure randomness comprehended as a
function (in the above case prescribing teams to derivation steps) seems to be, at
least intuitively, non-recursive (in the opposite case it is not random), and that
perhaps in the real, non idealized situations the randomness play very crucial role
in real physically embodied systems behaviors.
5 Creative Systems
To create is usually used for denoting the ability to cause something to come to ex-
istence, bring into being, originate something. Creativity is then usually considered
as the act of creation, so as a mental and social process involving the generation
of new concepts or new associations between the existing concepts, the ability to
finding ”new ways to look at things”; cf. (Minsky, 1986, p. 134). Two principal
attributes are usually required with respect to creative combinations of concepts
- the originality of the concept, and its appropriateness.
In order to decision about the appropriateness, in all of usual cases an anthro-
pocentric test (in certain extent similar to the Turing test known in AI) is used -
a test of the appropriateness in a given cultural context of a given human society.
The culture of the particular human society dictates what is required and what
is (at least marginally) acceptable. This is the important and inevitable outer an-
thropocentric determination of the inner individual creativity of each human mind
or some artificial information processing systems, too.
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During the history of the development of computers use, and during the ex-
periments with computational models of mental processes in the field of artificial
intelligence and cognitive science numerous systems have been developed which
are based on some hypotheses concerning the human mental activities. It have
been developed also a challenging area of agents, and multi-agent systems, the
fields which are focused to the understanding, construction, and practical use of
more and more autonomous computer-based systems - agents as presented e.g. in
(d’Inverno, Luck, 2001) -, and societies in which agents may interact - multi-agent
systems; see e.g. (Ferber, 1999).
The existence of (societies of) agents opens another, from some perspective - if
we consider human societies as a kind of multi-agent systems, and the interactions
of agents inside multi-agent systems as some level of the existence of culture in
these systems - a more general position for testing the appropriateness of results
of creativity.
Some artificially designed systems produce behaviors which, in the case that
a human being is considered as the system of this type, are called creative. The
author of this contribution does not know any theoretical, formal approach to
the study of systems of this type. However, there are some successfully working
systems of this type, and now we will mention examples of the two types of creative
systems in certain details on the base of (Kelemen, 2009).
In the field of artificial intelligence, numerous systems have been developed
which belong to the broad family of the so called goal-driven systems. The basic
idea common for all of such systems consists in comparing some representation
of an actual situation of a given problem with (representation of) a given desired
situation of it. The comparison results in an ordered set of formally defined and
represented differences. The differences are then, step by step, reduced using some
formally defined operators in order to reduce the number of differences between
the existing and the desired state of the problem. Operators and differences are
connected with respect the ability of the given operator to reduce the related with
it difference(s).
The principle was successfully applied e.g. in the famous General Problem
Solver (GPS) developed by H. A. Simon, A. Newell, and C. J. Shaw during the
end of fifties and beginning of sixties of the past century; for more details see e.g.
(Ernst, Newell, 1969).
A crucial point in the GPS which makes it relevant for our discussion is that
from simple concepts (operators) it constructs autonomously (without any human
assistance) a sequence of operators, a more complicated concept, which represents
the solution of the problem given at the beginning as an input to the system.
This sequence, if GPS is successful in solving the given problem, transforms the
starting situation describing the problem (the well-known tower-of-Hanoi or some
similar problems), into the situation which represents its solution. In this sense
GPS represents a creative system. However, its creativity is fundamentally based
on the definitions of operators, differences, situation descriptions, table of operator-
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differences connections, etc. provided by its human users. So, the success of GPS
in solving problems depends on the quality of these human-defined components.
Art is another field in which the agent paradigm works well, and creativity ex-
hibits its potentials very clearly. Perhaps the most popular among the computer-
based art-producing machines is the system called AARON. It began - according its
author Harold Cohen (Cohen, 1995) - its existence some time in the mid-seventies
of the past century; see e.g. (Cohen, 1973). The earliest versions of the system used
some perceptual primitives only for producing (drawing) images. It has the abil-
ity to differentiate between figure and the ground, to differentiate between open
forms and closed forms, and to differentiate between insideness and outsideness.
Moreover, it has the capability to perform various simple manipulations on the
structures it produced. Time-to-time, this more or less randomly executed ma-
nipulation on primitive line-structures resulted in figures having in certain sense
figurative contents, like ”human face” represented for instance by the expression
as follows: human-face IS (INSIDEclosed-form (UPPER-POSITION(closed-form,
closed-form) CENTRAL-POSITION(open form), DOWN(closed-form)))
This symbolic representation may look in corresponding free-hand drawing
representation like in Fig. 1 (a). A more complicated picture - an original drawing
made by AARON Fig. 1 (b) - of the ”human body” may be represented in similar
symbolic way. Of course, the human face can be then sophisticated also to more
and more complicated pictures, e.g. as the one in Fig. 1 (c), produced with a more
sophisticated version of AARON. Realize that what the human-face expresses, is
the definition of the human face for AARON.
We decided, associating the human-face with its formal expression that the
randomly scrawled lines remind the line-drawing of a human face in our minds.
Now we are able to instruct AARON to draw a new human face. But the result
will be not the same, as in the previous case, the same will be only the structure
expressed by the formal definition of what we consider to be a human face. In
such a way we can produce more and more concepts and instruct AARON to
draw more and more complicated drawings, each with certain degree of ”freedom”
of AARON’s drawing. For generating Fig. 2 the requirement was a picture of a
botanical garden with seven human beings (five distressed women and two men)
inside it.
AARON is - from the point of view of knowledge processing technologies - in
fact a rule-based knowledge-system in the usual meaning used e.g. in (Stefik, 1995).
Without going into the technical details of the construction (programming) of it,
we may conclude, in concordance with conclusions made in (Cohen, 1995), that
AARON constitutes an existence proof of the power of machines to do some of the
things traditionally connected with human thought and his creativity. ”If what
AARON is making is not art, what is it exactly, and in what ways, other than its
origin, does it differ from the ”real thing”? If it is not thinking - and let us to be
more explicit: creative thinking -, what exactly is it doing?” Cohen asks in last
strokes of (Cohen, 1995).
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Fig. 1. (Parts of) pictures. The first drown in AARON style; the second produce by
AARON, and taken from (McCorduck, 1990, p. 105), the third one produced by AARON,
and taken from (Kurzweil, 1999, p. 167).
6 Man-Machine Systems
The emergent nature of some creative phenomena appearing in complicated sys-
tems - like the man-machine societies are - we may also test using the so called
test of emergence proposed in (Ronald et al., 1999). We provide here an example
of such a system from the field of the interactive art discussed in more details and
with more examples in (Horakova, Kelemen, 2010).
The first interactive piece we mention is based on some ideas from the exper-
iments executed in the field of artificial life, and is created by Christa Sommerer
and Laurent Mignonneau. The project named A-Volve has been presented first in
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Fig. 2. Five distressed women and two men (one hiding, upper right). Taken from
(McCorduck, 1991, p. 135)
1994, and developed it during few next years. The audience of the A-Volve session
has possibilities to design artificially living creatures and to provide for them dif-
ferent modes of their behavior (aggression, snuggles, curiosity, caution, friendship,
etc.). In the virtual world behind of the screen a society of such creatures mu-
tually interact, and behaves according the habit of the members, and have been
influented also if the visitors touched the screen; see Fig. 2. More details on the
A-Volve can be found in (Whilelaw, 2004).
Let us now to analyze the project from the position of the test of emergence:
Design. The language L1 is the language in which the system is implemented, so,
a purely technical computer programming device used with a specific intention to
provide a usable, user-friendly software product for well-specified purposes. Ob-
server. The previous language substantially differs, of course, form the language
L2 in which the audience - the observers - interacts with the systems A-Volve.
This language contains tools for defining new creatures, and contains also kinds of
gestures for interacting with the creatures through touching the screen. Surprise.
The surprise follows then from the observation of the new created creatures as
members of he existing community behind the screen, and from the direct inter-
action with the creatures through touching the screen. This is the reason why we
propose that the real artistic creativity emerges in the case of the systems A-Volve
from interaction of human being with the machine.FFF
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Fig. 3. Interaction with the A-Volve. Photo Ch. Sommerer and L. Mignonneau, 1994.
7 Conclusion - What About to Study Reflexive Systems?
The emergence of creativity mentioned in the previous two chapters can be dis-
cussed also in the broader context of a special kind of systems derived from study
of some specificity of economic systems and their behavior, and called by George
Soros as reflexive systems (Soros, 1994). For explaining what kind of systems we
have in mind we borrow an example from (Soros, 1994, p. 42).
Let us suppose that active agents belonging to a given system work according
two functions. The first function, say f, is defined on the situations appearing on
the system. We will call it the cognitive function, because the participants - the
agents - effort to understand the system depends on perception of the systems.
More formally (but not in a pure formalistic manner) we have y = f(x). The second
function defines the participants’ participation on the changes of the system. This
participation is supposed to be rationalistic, so is based on the understanding
of the system and changes the situation inside of the system. We express this
dependence of the behavior on the understanding by the function x = g(y) and
call this function, according Soros proposal as the participating function. So, as the
result we have: y = f(x), and x = g(y), what gives y = f(g(y)), and x = g(f(x)).
This is, roughly speaking, and not in a very well formulated way, the fundamental
property of the reflexive systems.
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An example: Suppose that a globally influential group of economic experts
start to speak and write on a good functioning bank in a highly critical tone
and start to hesitate with respect of its economic future. What will happen? This
bank will quickly go to problems and in the more wrong case to bankruptcy.
More generally speaking, in certain situations, in certain types of systems the
observer’s observations change the observed object. So, ”objective” observations
are not possible in this type of systems. This type of systems are reflexive.
The development of a methodology for systematic study of such systems might
perhaps start form experimentations with artificially created societies of simple
economic agents as presented in a very impressive way in (Epstein, Axtell, 1996).
The experiments prove the way how some simple economic laws, e.g. the famous
Pareto law, emerges - laws originally formulated on the base of observation of the
behavior oh human economic societies - in very simple societies with some basics
of economic behavior of their members, and how many other interesting economic
and social situations and processes can be observed and experimentally tested in
the specific test-bed of the multi-agent system the author used in experiments
collected and analyzed in the above mentioned book .
What was presented concerning the creativity is another illustration of the
behavior of reflexive systems. Thanks to the reflexivity of the human society the
new creations are first surprising, but then become to be accepted, so, they become
appropriate for the society in which they have first the attribute of innovations
(technical innovations, artistic innovations, fashion innovations, etc.).
However, the study of reflexive systems are up to now and according the au-
thor best knowledge, out of the scope of interest of theoretical computer scientists,
despite of the fact, that reflexivity is perhaps the property of majority of the com-
plicated information processing systems (like human brains, computer networks,
man-machine systems and societies, etc.). What about to look for the much more
suitable formal frameworks in order to make first steps towards formal understand-
ing of this type of systems from computationalist positions similarly as we do that
with the simplified models of real computing engines in the field of traditional
computer science?
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